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BIANNUAL SURVEY
The court found that no one could have possibly served the
Clerk of the Board of Assessors without knowing his personal
identity, and thus, it appeared to be a "trap purposefully set for
the unwary." 64 This finding was corifirmed by the city's admission
that it had delayed its motion until the thirty days in which the
papers could have been served again had expired."5
The result in the instant case, however just, appears to hold
valid, service by estoppel. Technically, service was defective even
under CPLR 312, but it appears just and proper to dispense with
formal requirements when to adhere thereto would result in
substantial injustice.""
The interstate commerce objection: A stay under CPLR 2201
may best serve interests of justice.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court, in its
discretion, to refuse to entertain jurisdiction in an action between
non-residents upon a cause of action arising outside the state
of New York. This doctrine as applied to corporations has been
codified by Section 1314 of the New York Business Corporation
Law [hereinafter referred to as BCL]. It appears that if a
particular case comes within the ambit of section 1314(b) (1)-(4)
the court must hear that case.6 7  But where section 1314(b) (5)
controls, the court may in its discretion refuse jurisdiction.68
In the discretionary area courts generally will assume jurisdiction
only where a special circumstance exists.6 9 For example, if the
statute of limitations would bar any remedy in another jurisdiction
New York courts have found this to be a special circumstance. 70
In the recent case of Ceravit Corp. AG v. Black Diamond
Steamship Corp.,71 a Swiss corporation sued a foreign corporation
licensed to do business in New York for damage to cargo shipped
from Philadelphia to Switzerland. In the particular transaction
involved the defendant's ship had no contact with New York.
64 Cale-Rome, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 44 Misc. 2d 675, 678, 255
N.Y.S.2d 12, 15 (Sup. Ct. 1964).65 N.Y. RF-L Paop. TAx LAW § 702 provides that a proceeding to re-
view a tax assessment must be commenced within thirty days after the fully
completed assessment roll.
66 Cf. Avery v. O'Dwyer, 201 Misc. 989, 110 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct.),
modified on other grounds, 280 App. Div. 766, 113 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1st Dep't
1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 658, 112 N.E.2d 428 (1953).
67 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1314, comments.68 See, e.g., Yesuvida v. Pennsylvania R.R., 200 Misc. 815, 111 N.Y.S.
2d 417 (Sup. Ct. 1951).69Id. at 818, 111 N.Y.S2d at 420.
70 See, e.g., Williamson v. Palmer, 181 Misc. 610, 43 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup.
Ct 1943); Randle v. Inecto, Inc., 131 Misc. 261, 226 N.Y. Supp. 686 (Sup.
Ct 1928).7144 Misc. 2d 484, 254 N.Y.S2d 253 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
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The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.7 2  Plaintiff opposed the motion on two
grounds: (1) the statute of limitations would bar any remedy in
Pennsylvania, and (2) no undue burden would be placed upon
defendant which has its principal place of business in New York.
In granting the motion to dismiss, the court held Section 1314(b) (5)
of the BCL to be violative of the commerce clause 73 when applied
to a cause of action in which defendant foreign corporation is a
carrier engaged in interstate commerce; the transaction involved did
not occur in New York; and the vessel had no contact with
New York.
It should be observed that a "special circumstance" might well
have been found in the instant case, i.e., the statute of limitations
had run in Pennsylvania. Therefore, if defendant had not raised
the commerce objection, the court could have exercised its discretion
and heard the case.
The commerce objection will lie where the exercise of juris-
diction by a state court over a foreign corporation would impose
an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce. 74 Conversely it
will not lie where the "orderly and effective administration of
justice [would require] the carrier to submit to suit"' 5 in the
forum state. Thus, in each case the court must carefully analyze
the factual situation with particular emphasis on the defendant's
contacts with the forum state.
In considering whether a trial on the merits is an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce, the courts apparently have a dual
standard. A comparison of two leading cases leads one to the
conclusion that where a common carrier is involved, the courts
require a greater number of contacts with the forum than in the
non-carrier situation."4 Justification exists for such a requirement
since a prospective suit in the forum state might necessitate a
72CPLR 3211(a)(2). The commerce objection has been classified as
subject matter jurisdiction in the Baltimore Steamship case, infra note 75.
But since failure to raise the commerce objection may be deemed a waiver
of it, one might argue that the commerce objection is not really subject
matter jurisdiction, because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.
See Meyers v. American Locomotive Co., 201 N.Y. 163, 94 N.E. 605 (1911).
73 U.S. CosT. art. I, § 8.
74 See International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511
(1934), and cases cited therein.75 Baltimore Mail S.S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N.Y. 379, 199 N.E. 628
(1936).
76 Compare Baltimore Mail S.S. Co. v. Fawcett, supra note 75, with
Banque De France v. Supreme Court, 287 N.Y. 483, 41 N.E.2d 65, cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 646 (1942). In the former case, the defendant-common
carrier's contacts with New York were: (1) a bank account; and, (2)
possibly, solicitation of freight or traffic. Jurisdiction was denied. In the
latter case, the non-carrier French Bank's contacts with New York were:
(1) the conduct of some business incidental to its business in France; and,
(2) the maintenance of a bank account here. Jurisdiction was sustained.
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deviation from the carrier's trade route and a return to New
York. This constitutes an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce, since the carrier could easily be sued in ports along its
trade route. However, in a non-carrier enterprise, a prospective
suit in any forum will necessitate transportation of witnesses, parties
and other evidence. Therefore, the courts will require fewer
physical contacts with the forum state in a case involving a non-
carrier.
Generally, in the carrier situation, where the ship involved
never enters the forum state the courts will not entertain the
suit."7 The Ceravit case extends the general rule. There, the
court found that the defendant's "ships regularly ply the waters
of New York harbor. However, defendant's ship did not have
any contact with New York harbor in the transaction involved
in this suit." 78 (Emphasis added.) It appears, therefore, that the
court has added the further restriction that the particular trans-
action sued upon must result from a contact with New York.
It is submitted that the Ceravit case dealt a harsh blow to the
plaintiff, whose remedy was barred elsewhere by the statute of
limitations, but was not barred in New York. If the vessel
involved were scheduled to put in at New York on a subsequent
voyage, plaintiff might have proceeded as follows: by commencing
the action against the carrier in New York; and then, opposing the
commerce objection by a motion to stay the action pursuant to
CPLR 2201 until the arrival of said vessel. Such motion would
be made on the ground that if the stay were granted, the vessel
and its crew (necessary to any trial) would not be required to
deviate from the normal avenue of commerce. Thus, the essential
ingredient for sustaining the commerce objection, i.e., the un-
reasonable burden, would be eliminated.
A judge, following the liberal philosophy of procedure, could
reason that Section 1314(b) (5) of the BCL allows the court, where
a special circumstance exists, to hear the case if there is no con-
stitutional objection. Such a judge would be justified in granting
a stay and in hearing the case at a time when the commerce
objection would not lie. An application of this rationale would
seem to lead to a more just result since a plaintiff barred from
recovery elsewhere by the statute of limitations would still be
afforded a substantive remedy.
77 See, e.g,q Baltimore Mail S.S. Co. v. Fawcett, supra note 75.78 Ceravit Corp. AG v. Black Diamond S.S. 'Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 484,
486, 254 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
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